security-threat-model
基于代码仓库的威胁建模,枚举信任边界、资产、攻击者能力、滥用路径和缓解措施,并撰写简洁的 Markdown 威胁模型。仅在用户明确要求对代码库或路径进行威胁建模、枚举威胁/滥用路径,或执行 AppSec 威胁建模时触发。不要因一般架构总结、代码审查或非安全设计工作而触发。
机器翻译查看英文原文
Repository-grounded threat modeling that enumerates trust boundaries, assets, attacker capabilities, abuse paths, and mitigations, and writes a concise Markdown threat model. Trigger only when the user explicitly asks to threat model a codebase or path, enumerate threats/abuse paths, or perform AppSec threat modeling. Do not trigger for general architecture summaries, code review, or non-security design work.
适用对象:云服务、运维与安全。自动收录 · 待核查。
原作者说明节选
从固定版本的 SKILL.md 提取,保留原文语言。以下内容属于作者说明,本站尚未验证安装、兼容或运行结果。
查看英文原文
原文涵盖的主题
- Threat Model Source Code Repo
- Quick start
- Workflow
- 1) Scope and extract the system model
- 2) Derive boundaries, assets, and entry points
- 3) Calibrate assets and attacker capabilities
- 4) Enumerate threats as abuse paths
- 5) Prioritize with explicit likelihood and impact reasoning
Deliver an actionable AppSec-grade threat model that is specific to the repository or a project path, not a generic checklist. Anchor every architectural claim to evidence in the repo and keep assumptions explicit. Prioritizing realistic attacker goals and concrete impacts over generic checklists. 1) Collect (or infer) inputs: Repo root path and any in-scope paths. Intended usage, deployment model, internet exposure, and auth expectations (if known). Any existing repository summary or architecture spec. Use prompts in references/prompt-template.md to generate a repository summary. Follow the required output contract in references/prompt-template.md. Use it verbatim when possible. Identify primary components, data stores, and external integrations from the repo summary. Identify how the system runs (server, CLI, library, worker) and its entrypoints. Separate runtime behavior from CI/build/dev tooling and from tests/examples. Map the in-scope locations to those components and exclude out-of-scope items explicitly. Do not claim components, flows, or controls without evidence. Enumerate trust boundaries as concrete edges between components, noting protocol, auth, encryption, validation
这里只展示节选,请以完整原文和当前要求为准。
- 来源仓库
- davila7/claude-code-templates
- 源文件
- cli-tool/components/skills/security/security-threat-model/SKILL.md
- 固定版本
- 21be197f100a12b8d0dd9a211cc244c8179f84d3
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原作者:davila7/claude-code-templates · 原作者仓库元数据。文档核查:未核查。最近来源检查:2026-11-09T15:01:40.607Z。
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