security-analysis
Reviews code or a change for exploitable vulnerabilities — injection, auth and access-control gaps, secret exposure, unsafe deserialization, SSRF, path traversal, and reports them with the concrete attack path. Use this whenever the user asks about security, vulnerabilities, hardening, or a security review, and also proactively when a change touches authentication, authorization, user input handling, file paths, subprocess calls, deserialization, or credentials. For general correctness review, use code-review.
Target: Cloud, operations & security. Automatically collected · unverified.
Excerpt from the author’s documentation
Extracted from a fixed version of SKILL.md in its original language. This is the author’s documentation; installation, compatibility and runtime results have not been verified by this site.
Read the original English text
Topics in the source
- Security analysis
- 1. Map trust boundaries first
- 2. Trace source to sink
- 3. Check the categories that get missed
- 4. Rank by exploitability, not by category name
- 5. Report with the attack path and the fix
- Honesty rules
A finding is only real if you can describe the attacker, what they control, and what they get. "This could be unsafe" is not a finding — it is an unfinished one. The discipline here is identical to debugging: trace from a source you can influence to a sink that does something dangerous, and prove the path is unbroken. Scope: this is for reviewing code you or the user are authorized to work on — your own projects, your employer's, or an engagement you have permission for. It finds and fixes defects. It does not produce working exploits against systems you do not control. You cannot assess code without knowing where untrusted data enters. Identify: Sources: HTTP request bodies, query params, headers, cookies, uploaded files, webhook payloads, message queues, third-party API responses, filenames, environment in multi-tenant contexts, and anything read from the database that a user once wrote Sinks: SQL, shell, filesystem paths, HTTP requests made by the server, template rendering, deserializers, eval-alikes, redirects, log statements that feed a parser The boundary: where a request stops being anonymous and becomes a principal with rights That last one, written down explicitly, is whe
This is an excerpt. Refer to the complete source and its current requirements.
- Source repository
- OKHP3/skillz
- Source file
- community/security-analysis/SKILL.md
- Fixed revision
- 7b187777d42ab7bc7bab1e5f2c940cd3139ecebf
Sources and evidence
This record was collected automatically. Its documentation, suitability and runtime behavior have not been manually verified.
Author: OKHP3/skillz · original repository metadata. Documentation review: Not reviewed. Last source check: 2026-11-10T10:00:54.335Z.
Categories are inferred from names, descriptions and paths. They do not establish compatibility.
License and attribution
MIT. Third-party content and copyright remain with their authors. Refer to the original license and terms.
Original license ↗Synchronization, copying and user-reported success do not mark a resource as runtime-tested.
Limitations and notes
- Collecting metadata does not mean this site has installed, adapted, runtime-tested or security-reviewed the resource.